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Modelling Challenges
• The 'canonical' model (Woodford 2003) has been seen as not ideally suited to handling to capital market imperfections -In general, the weaknesses of the New Keynesian paradigm are well-known (Goodhart 2008 , Tovar 2008 , paradigm are well-known (Goodhart 2008 , Tovar 2008 , Chari et.al. 2009 ) -But...its either the best we have or it may be more fruitful to 'repair' it rather than discard it completely
• Provides a 'disciplined' way of thinking about interactions of key macroeconomic variables
Focus of the Study
• Spreads play a central role in the transmissions mechanism -Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995) • The economy is 'interest sensitive', that is, there exists a "credit channel"
-May operate through balance sheets or bank lending behaviour -May operate through balance sheets or bank lending behaviour -We don't take a stand on one versus the other although focus is on the latter in this study
• Walsh (2009)"...factors that generate movements in spreads, or the degree to which these movements reflect inefficient fluctuations that call for policy responses" still eludes us -In particular why are spreads subject to sharp movements and why can they be so volatile? -Do they really matter (in a crisis): NO Chari. et.al. 2008 • Lifetime utility function
• Borrowing is done ONLY via intermediary -One period contracts (riskless) + households can insure against various risks -Necessary because • 1. heterogeneity of households; 2. credit frictions; 3. risk sharing • Represents a 'key' source of financial frictions
Deposit and borrowing rates (riskless) (
MODEL: Households II
• B t (i) is the budget constraint • Lifetime utility is maximized subject to • Spread • Policy rule
-CB makes optimal policy projections that asymptotically approaches the s.s. (Svensson & Tetlow 2005) • Model closed with 2 market clearing conditions
Evolution of b b
• Aggregate over all borrowers
• Aggregate budget constraints
• Substitution yields debt dynamics: • φ s =1, φ b /h for both types the same in s.s. • ω=2% in s.s.
• Debt/GDP=80% in s.s.
• Y,Z=1 in s.s. • Profit max as before but s.t.
(passed on in the GVT budget)
• Quantitative easing -An increase in the monetary base (i.e., bank reserves)
• Where
Dynamics of Unconventional MP
• Credit Easing
• Quantitative Easing Modified -qua ntita tive easing Modi fi ed -credi t ea s i ng -.04
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Modified -qua nti ati ve easi ng • Empirical -Many ways to proceed but...
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Conclusions
• A highly level of convexity is needed to match sharp movements and volatility in the spread -a less non-linear intermediation costs function would lead to conditions as in the Great Moderation -A challenge is to link this type of phenomenon to how intermediation -A challenge is to link this type of phenomenon to how intermediation costs are actually determined
• Credit easing when its a 'free lunch' to the CB can reduce the spread • QE is less effective and actually leads to a rise in the spread.
This appears to describe the early days of the crisis in the fall of 2007
